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1 Introduction 
This text is a seIf-contained formal exposition oi the dynamic model discussed in Pereira (98). 1 develop 
the model in section 2 and in section 3 1 characterize equilibrium. In section 4 1 do comparative statics. 
2 The Model 
In this section 1 present the roadel. 
Consider a market for a non-storable homogeneous (search) good that opens faf 2 periods. 
Each of the game's 2 periods is corn¡x¡sed of 3 stages. In perlad 1, first firms simultaneously choose 
investments; each firm observes onIy its cost realization. Second, firms simultaneously choose prices. And third, 
consumers simultaneously make their search and purchase decisions; then production and delivery take place 
instantaneously, and agents receive their perlad 1 payoffs. In perlad 2, first firms suffer a shock to their 
marginal production costs; each firm observes only its cost realization. Second, firms simuItaneously choose 
prices; customers leam, free of charge, the current price of the finn they purchased from in period 1. And third, 
consumers simultaneously make their search and purchase decisions; then production and delivery take place 
instantaneously, agents receive their period 2 payoffs, and the market closes. 
There is a continuumof consumers of unit measure. Consumers are identical and risk neutral. A consumer 
who buys at prtce p demands x(p), where x(.): (0,+"") ----+ (0,+"") Is a twice differentiable, bounded functíon 
with a bounded inverse, decreasing and strictly concave. The surplus of a ronsumer who pays p is S(p) := 
J x(t)dt. 
To obtain a price quote from a firm a ronsUlTEI' must paya constant amount (1E (0,+=): the search costo 
Within each perlod, search is instantaneous, a consumer may solicit any number of price quotes, and may at any 
time accept any offer received to date. Consumers leam in perlod 2, free of charge, the current price of the firm 
they bought from in perlod 1. This creates a switching cost, equal to the expected search expenditure. 1 assume: 
(A.n Each ronsumer picks at random which finn to sample, froro the set of firms whose prlce he does not know. 
A consumer's infonnation set just after bis k~th search (or retum) step in perlod t, H¡b consists 01 a II 
prices previously observed1• A consumer's strategy for stage 3 of period t is a stopping rule, S¡(H¡k), that fOr every 
1 In period2, it includes fue current price charged by the firm fue consumer boughl from in period 1. 
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possible search cost, and sequence oi observations, says whether search should stop or continue. A COnsumer's 
payoff is the sum oí expected perlod consumer surpluses, oet Di the search expenditure. 
There i5 a continuum oí firms of urot measure. Finns are risk neutral and may differ in marginal 
production costs. 
A firm's cost reducing investment ae [0,+<><» generares marginal cost level el with probability ].l( a), and 
marginal rost level eh with probability 1 - J1(a), where O ~ CI < Ch < +00. This specification contains four 
assumptions: first, marginal production costs are constant; second, the rost type distribution is at most binary; 
third, each finn's probability of having a low cost depends on1y on its investment; and fourth, the support of 
the cost distribution is independent of the firms' individual and aggregate investments. 1 assume ¡,t(.): [0,+00) 
----? 10,1] is a twice differentlable function, strictly increasing and concave: ¡,t"(a) < O < tt'(a), \fa,:{}; ro 
invesbnent induces a degenerate distribution at e = eh: ¡.J(O) = O; and finns can never get a low cOst with 
probability 1: ¡.J(a) < 1, \fa<+oo, and !il!!. ¡.J(a) = 1. Later 1 will make an asswnption that guarantees that in 
equilibrium firms make positive investments. Denote the realized value of variable y by y. 
To analyze idiosyncratic oost volaHlity denote the probability that a firm who had cost level e~ in 
period 1 has cost level C, in period 2 by v .. (r) (1',S '" l,h); v", is a differentiahle function oi rr:R, a parameter 
which measures the shock's intensity. 1 assume: the shock is independent across a11 firms, and identically 
distributed across finns with the same cost type, that the probability a period 1 low cost finn remains low cost 
in period 2 is higher than the probability a period 1 high cost firm becomes low cost in period 2: VII > VhI' and 
that a rise in r increases the probability of a firm changing its cost type: vÍI < O < ví,¡. The probability oi a 
finn having a low cost in period 2 is m(a,r); = tt(a)v¡/r) + [1- .u(a)]Vh¡(Y)' 
Decompose the high cost as eh = CI + .1, L1 > Oi cl can be interpreted as a common cost component. 1 will use 
detenninistic shifts2 in CI in period 2 to analyze the effects of industry wide cost volatilify. 
The per consumer profit of a finn with cost c~ who charges price p is mp;c) := (p - c~)x(p) (-r=l,h). Let p::' 
:= argmaxmp;cJ. 1 caH p;' the cost e. firm's monopoly price. By strict concavity of demand p;' is unique and 
p 
strictly increasing in c'" I,assume onIy low cost firms can charge pr without losing money, i.e., pr < Ch' The 
expected period 1 consumer measure (or share) oI a finn that charges price p in period 1 is fPl(P), and the 
expected period 2 consumer measure of a finn that charges price p' in perlod 2 and had consumer measure q,l in 
period 1 is f/J2(P';q,l)' A finn's perlod t expected profit equals its period t per consumer profit, times the expected 
;,> A stochastic shock, perfectly oorrelated across finns, generares Ihe same quantative resulls. 
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A finn's information set in perlad t just befare stage 2, Hi, consists of the firm's investment leve1, cost 
realization and rollSUlt'e' measure realizations lo date, and all prices it charged to date. A firm's stage 1 
strategy j5 an investment level. A flrm's stage 2 strategy is a pricing rule that for each possible history, says 
which price the finn should charge. A firm's payoff i5 the sum of expected perlod profits, net oí the investment 
expenditure. 
When a firm chooses to charge a price higher than the maximum consumers are willing to pay, and 
hence forgoes the chance of selling its product, 1 say the furo is inactive; otherwise 1 say the finn is active. 1 
assurne that consumers can only leam whether a finn is inactive through search. 
The solution concept is a refinement oí Nash equilibrium. First 1 restrict attention to symmetric pme 
strategies. Recall that consumers are identical, and that after uncertainty is resolved there are two firm types. 
Next 1 introduce the two remaining restrictions. Consumers do not know the prices charged by individual firms. 
However, they hold common beliefs about the price distribution across firms. 1 assume3: 
(A.2) Consumers' search strategy satisfies sequential rationality, Le., ronswners choose whether to search 
again to maximize net expeded surplus, given the previously observed prices and their ronjecture of the 
price distribution at the unsearched firms, conditional on any observed infonnation. 
(A.3) Consumers' beliefs about the price distribution satisfy the independent prices eonjecture, Le., ronsumers 
believe firrns choose prices independently and maintain this assumption throughout the search process. 
The cumulative distribution function, l)(.;Hlk ), gives the consumers' beliefs about the (unconditlonal) 
market price distribution for period t;4 the lowest and highest prices on its support are el and p" T(. I q) gives 
the consumers' beliefs about the price a finn charges in perlod 2, conditional on having charged price q in period 
1. The price of a finn with cost c~in period t isp!", 
An equilibrium is: a stopping rule for each period, ronswner beliefs, a pricing rule ior each perlod and 
cost type, and an investment leveL {si(Hlk),S;(H2k),l}·(.,.Hlk),.f2·(.;H;'>k),T·(.I.),P;I,Pih,P21(H~),pih(H~),a'}, 
such that: 
:3 T follow Bagwe11 & Ramey (96), See Pereira (98). 
4 F,lpIH) gives Ihe OOI1S\lDleJli' b<:>Jiefs about ¡he proportion of finns Ihatcharge a priceno grealer Ihan p in period l. 
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(i) Given beliefs F¡·(.;Hn ), 1'*(. L), F;(.;H2k ), and the search cost (1, ron$UII\elS choose stopping rules s;(Hlk ) 
and si(H2k) to maximize the net sum of the expected perlad surplus; 
(ii) Given the stoppingruless;(Hu ), siJH2k ), and the cost shock, finns choose pridng rules pi .. , pi .. ( Hi), and 
investment level a"", to maximize the nel sum of expected profits, Le., to respectively solve the problems: 
(Hi) Beliefs F¡·(.;Hn >, T(, I ,), and F,.+(,;H2J) agree with the price distributions induced by the cost shock, 
inveshnent level a*, and pricing rules pz. *( Hz), pi-r' 
3 Characterization of Equilibrium 
In this section 1 construct the equilibriurn by working backwards. The consumers' equilibriurn behavior 
consists of holding reservation prices. Low cost firms are a1ways active and charge their monopoly price. High 
cost finns, íor either perlod, are sometimes active, others inactive, which allows íor four types oí equilibria. 
When high cost finns are active they charge the minirnurn of the reservation price and their monopoly price. 
3.1 Second Period 
3.1.1 Third Stage: The Search Game 
In this sub-sectlon 1 characterize the consumers' period 2 search equilibriurn. 
Given (A.2) consumers optimize with respect to beliefs, which given (A.3) do not depend of the prices 
observed. Thus, the corisumer's search problem can be soIved using dynamic programming, Under my assumptions 
sequential search is optimal (Morgan & Manning (85), proposition 3). 
The perlod 2 maximurn expected surplus, net DE the search expendíture, oE a consumer who's best 
available offer is p and behaves optimaUy is Vo(p). After receiving an offer a COllSllllla' must choose between 
one oí two actions: accept the best available offer and termínate search, the value of which is S(p), or, draw a 
new price at rost 0', and subsequently behave optimally, the expected value of which is Ko(O') := - O' + 
J Vo(p'") dFz(p'), where p'" = minfp,p1. Search should stop when a sufficiently aUractive price is observed. The 
Bellman equation of the consumer's problem is: 
V.(p) = max{5(p), K"j (1) 
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Given that demand is bounded and (A.l), (1) has a well defined and (inHe optimal value function and optimal 
search terminates in a finite number of steps with probability 1 (De Grool: Lemma 1, p. 350, Th. 1, p. 347). 
Given that S, < O, that 5(+00):;; Ko(+""') < Kg(a) < SCE,2), for O'E(O,+ool, and that the value of search is 
decreasing in a, it foUows from the intermediate value theorem that for every O"E(O,0:2], a2 ::;; +<><>, equation: 
" S(p) = - cr + J Vo(p"')dF2{p) 
<, 
has a unique 5010tion P2E(O,+<»], Given pp and using (2) and S, < O, it follows that: 
{
S(P) 
Va(p)= 
S(P,) 
, and that the optimal period 2 search strategy consists of holding a reservation price, P2' Using (3) on (2): 
p, J ¡S(p) - S(p,)] dF,(p) =cr 
~, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
From (4) it íollows that íor every strictly positive search cost, the period 2 reservation price is strictIy bigger 
that the lowest price charged in perlod 2: Vo>O, E2 < P,.. 
3.1.2 Second Stage: The Pricing Game 
In this sub-section 1 characterlze the priC€s charged in equilibrlurn in perlod 2. 
If a finn charges a price higher than the reservation priC€, p > Pz, it makes no sales. If a firm cbarges a 
price no bigger than the reservation price, p S pp it keeps its perlod 1 customers5, and in addition, given (A,l) 
and that there is a continuum of consumers and firms, it gets an expected amsumer measure equa1 to the measure 
oE consumers searching in perlod 2 (consumers that in perlod 1 bought from a firm that is inactive in perlod 2) 
divided by the rneasure oE active firms. The expected consurner rneasure of a firm that charges pis: 
where n, is the measure of finns that in perlod t charge a price no bigger than the reservation prlce (i.e., active 
finns), and Lieis the measure ofconsumers searching in perlod 2 (1 omit n2 in t/JJ. Since E.2 < pp n2 > O. 
5 Recallfuat fuere is a switching casI. 
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Lemma 1: In equilibrium, in perlod 2: (i) Price is non-decreaslng in the cost level: e2 '" P21 5 P2h = P 2< (ji) 
The low cost firros' price is strictly lower tban the reservation price: P21 < fJ2; (iii) Low cost firrns charge their 
monopoly price: P21 = pi i (iv) When the reservation price is ro smaller than the high cost level, high cost 
finns charge the mmimum of the reservation price and their monopoIy price¡ otherwise, they are inactive: 
Proof: See Pereira (98). 'JI 
Using Lemma 1, when the reservation price is no smaller than the high cost leve!, all finns are active; 
otherwise, only low cost finns are active: 
Furthermore, the perlad 2 market cumulative distribution funeUon of prices is: 
ProbIP,<pl ml= r: (;=; p< P21 (5) 
3.2 First Period 
3.2.1 Third Stage: The Search Game 
In this sub-section 1 charaderize the constuners' periad 2 search equilibrium. Now the consumer.f 
problem is more complicated since the reward function may not be monotoni¿; on prlce, Nevertheless, it can be 
solved using dynamic programming and sequential search is optimal. 
The period 1 maximum expected surplus, net of the search expenditure, of a oonsumer who's acceptance 
set is Al and behaves optimally 1s V¡(A¡), The expected value in period 1 of drawing a new prlce at cost u, and 
subsequently behaving optimalIy is K¡(a):= - a+ J Vi (Al) dFl , The period 2 netmaximumexpected surplus, of a 
consumer who's best avai,lable offer in period 1 is p and behaves optimally is G(p) '" J Vo(u)dH(ulp). The value 
of accepting the best available oHer p and tenninating search in perlod 1 is S(p) + G(p), The Belhnan equation 
of the consumers' problem is: 
6 When Ibis 0CCI.mi, lbe optimal sel oE acceplable prices may be disconnecled and Ibe reservation price property lool 
V,(A,) = max[S(p) + G(p), K,) 
As before, the consumer' bl 
S pro em has a well defined and fi 'te ' 
ni optmtaI vaIue function, and optimal search 
terminares in a finite nUmber oi steps with probability 1, 
If consumers search the expression ior V (A ) be . 
I ¡ can wntten more explicitly as: 
V,(A,) = -cr+ V'(A,)[' - f dF'(P)]+ f[S(p) + G(p)]dl\(p) 
A, A, 
TIte optimal acceptance set is A + So '. 
l' me mampulatIOn gives: 
f[S(P) + G(p) - V,(A;J1dF,(p) =cr 
A' , (6) 
which defines A· FoDowin H + { 
l' g ey (79), let Al :== p/S(p) + G(p) _ V* > O} o '_ (.J 
and Al-:= {~S(p) + G(p) _ V/ < O). The sets A+ a d A- 1, Al .- rjS(p) + G(p) - vt "" o}, 
1 n 1 are non-empty gi th S 
Kla) < S(ed+ G( E¡), ior GtE(O,+<-o), and that the value of the sea h b v,en at (+oo)+G(+oo):; Ktf+oo) < 
rc pro lern IS decreasin ' Q , 
non-emply given the continuity oi SU + G(.), Then A" _ A+ 00 ()Q g m O; andA1 IS then 
, 1 - 1 VAl' where Al is any subset f AO . 
consumer's optimal strategy is to' 10 o l, I.e., a 
• S P to search when he observes a price on A· othe' . 
1, rwlse continue to search, 
3.2.2 Second Stage: The Pricing Game 
In this sub-section I h ti . 
e aracte ze the fITmS' optimal " 
pncmg strategy, and I further characterize the consumers' period 2 optitnal search strategy. 
By a previous argument the ed 
, expect consumer share of a finn that h . 
c argespls: 
lo <= pEA; $,(p,P,J = -'-nI {:: pe:A; 
As before nI > O. 
Lemma 2: In equilibrlum, in penod 1: (O) Low cost firms are 1 
firms is -d '. a ways aclive: PI/iE Ai; (i) The price of active 
non ecreasmg In the cast leveI: PI,tE Ai, 'tt'1' ~ =: < __ ." '. 
level, then hi h ' " El P1t - Plh - PI' (U) lE pnce IS decreasing in the cost 
g cost finns are macflve' p < • ( ••• ) 
• lh PlI ~ Pl~i! Al; 111 The Iow cost firms' price is t' ti I 
the highest acceptable price: Pu < supA;; (iV) Low cost firms charge the'r mI' s nc y ower (han 
I onopo y pnce: PlI =: p¡"'. 
7 
8 
Proof: (O) Notiee first that at least one type of firms must be active, otherwise the left~hand side of (6) is 
zero while the search cost is strictly positive. Now suppose PlhE A; and PlIf! A;. JI it is optimal for high cost 
firms to be active, then it must be the case that cbarging Pl~ earns them a non~negative profit. Thus, iI a low cost 
firm. deviates and charges Plh it wilI also make a strictly positive profit, eontradicting the optimality of PII' 
Noting that the expected consumer measure is constant with respect to prlce when Pl.E A;, Ior all "t, the 
argument in Pereira (96) applies. 
(ü) (1) impli" Ihal if Ihe price ¡, de"ea,ing in Ihe ,",llevel, Ihen bolh type, of finns cannol be active. 
Using (O) the result Iollows. 
oro The "'" p" < pa ¡, obviou,. Jf p,. < p", Ihen Pu < '"p A; mu,1 hold olh",wi", Ihe Ieft-hand ,ide of (6) ¡, 
zero while the search cost is strlctly positive. 
(iv) As in Pereira (98). 'JI 
Given Lemmas 1 and 2, and the definition oI v .... the distribution oI the price a finn charges in period 2, 
conditional on charging prlce q in period 1 is: 
E 
<= p < p 
-, 
<= P $P<P2 <= q"" Pu 
-, 
<= P ?: P2 
Prob[P2$pIPl =ql "" 
[v>;O 
<= p<p 
-, 
<= '~ $ p < P2 <= q "" Pn 
<= p2: P2 
Next I will further characterize the consumers' optimal search strategy. Given Lemmas 1 and 2, and the 
expression aboye, G(P11) = VIIS( p¡"') + (1 ~vu)S(pJ, and assuming fue equilibrium refinement that when consumers 
observe a firm charging a price difIerent from pr they infer that the firm has a high cost G(p') = VIoJS (pr) + (1 ~ 
VIoJ)S(pJ. Hence, G(p) ~ C(p') "" (VII ~ Vhl)[S(prJ - S(p¿)] > O. Hence, for p,'" < p', S(.) + C(.) is decreasing, and 
the set Af í'I {plp ~ pr} is ~ singleton; denote its value by PI. Furthermore, A; í'I {~p ?!: p¡"'} = [pr, P1], which 
aIlows alter sorne manipulation aJlows one to write equation (6) as 
(7) 
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Thus, the optirnal period 1 strategy consists of holding a reservation price, p¡. Equation (7) holds for 
O" E(O,S(pr>], and S(P::') < CTv so from now on restriet attention to O"E (O,S(P::' )]. 
Next 1 will characterize the high cost Iirms' optimal pridng strategy. I assume: 
(A.4) ensures that high cost firms become inactive in perlod 1, when the perlod 1 reservation price becomes 
sufficiently low7• Next 1 introduce notation. The perlod 1 reservation price value, TI' that makes high cost firms 
indifferent between being active and inactive in period 1, when the perlod 1 reservation is below the high cost 
level and period 2 reservation price no lower than the high cost leve!, PI < Ch S (h, is defined by: 
The period 1 reservation price value, Tz, that makes high cost firms indifIerent between being active or inactive 
in perlod 1, when both reservatlon prices are below the high cost level, PI' P2 < c~, is defined by: 
Lemma 3: In equilibrium, in period 1:(i) The value '¡ is a continuous decreasing function of the minimum of 
the high cost firms' monopoly price and perlod 2 reservation price, and the high cost firms' transition 
probability, T¡(Vhl,min(Pl,pJ:'}), such that TI: (O,Vu)X[Ch,Ph'] ~ b,f¡), where ft :"" rlO,cJ "" Ch and 
!:1 :"" rl(vlI,ph')· When the perlod 1 reservation price is below the high cost leve} and perlod 2 reservation price 
no lower than the high cost level, the set of parameter values for which high cost firms are active in period 1 is 
non--empty, and the set of values for which high cost firms are inactive in period 1 is also non--empty. The value 
T2 is a continuous decreasing function of the high cost firms' transition probability, rivhl), such that T2: 
(O, v,,) ~ (!2,12), where ~ := rlO) = Ch and !2 :"" r2(vII)' When both reservation prices are below the high 
cost leveI, the set oI parameter values for which high cost firms are active in period 1 is non--empty, and the set 
of values for which high cost (irms are inactive in period 1 is also non--empty. (Ü) When the reservation price 
is no smaller than the high cost level, high cost finns charge fue minimum of the reservation price and their 
monopoly price¡ when the reservation prlce is lower tban the high cost leve!, but not too low high cost firms 
charge the reservation price; otherwise high cost firms are inactive, Le., 
7 The set ol parameters values far which high rost finns are inactive in perlod 1 is non·empty. 
{minlp"pFl 
Plh= PI 
PI e (Pt,-t-oo) 
{: Ch~Pl 
{: (rt:S PI < eh ::s; P2) or(r2 :S PI < Ch' P2 < eh) 
Proof: (i) When P2 ~ C/u if a finn a high cost finn charges Pv. = PI its payoff is 
(8) 
and jf charges Phi < PI its payaff i5: 
[Vh17t(pi,c¡) + (1 - Vh1)7t(P2h,Ch)( !~) (9) 
Equating (8) and (9) gives (l/nI) [¡r(rl'C¡') + vM/r(pj',c¡) + (1 - V¡'I)1r(P21"C¡,)] = O. Define V'¡(rlivIII,Plh) := 
(l/nI) [nú],ch) + v¡,¡1r(pj ,el) + (1 - V¡,¡)1t(Plh'Ch)]. It is straightforward that O < IJIl(Ch ¡vltl' P2h J, '1/( VIII' Pv.)¡ 
condition (A.4) implies that V'l(pj ¡Vh/,P2h) < 0, 'I/(V/d'P2/l); and since 'Pi is monotonic on al! its arguments, ít 
follows from the intermediate value theorem that for every (V/d'Pzr,) on (O,V¡¡)X(Ch, P;:'), there is one and muy one 
TI on( pi,eh)' The implicit function theorem irnplies that rl:::: TI(Vh¡, P2h) with r¡: (O, VII) x [clI,pr] -----) [.!:I,~J· 
Since ~ < rl(OA) = Ch' there is a PI on (r¡h), for every VIII and P1h' (A.4) implies thatpj < Tl(VI/'Pi:') < !1' 
hence there is a P¡ on (pi ,TI), for every VI< and P2/l' Case P2 < Ch is similar. 
(ü) Follows from (i) and Lemma 1. 'JI 
Using Lemmas 2 and 3 the measure of active firms in perlod 1 is: 
the measure oí consumers searching in perlod 2 ls: 
dc,t l.om "" 
(oh s: Pt,P2) or (Pt < ch < P2) 
"" 
r2 s: Pt' P2 < Ch 
V, 
"" 
pi s: Pt < r2' P2 <Oh 
the period 1 rnarket cumulative distribution function of prices is: 
Prob[P,<pl jil, {~ "" p< Pu 
"" 
PIl s: P < Plh 
"" 
P 2:Plh 
(10) 
10 
G(Pn) - G(p) = (VII - Vh/)[S(pi> - S(P2)] (11) 11 
3,2,3 Firsl Slage: TIte lnveslmenl Game 
In tros sub-section 1 characterize the investment equiIibrium. 
Assume that Ji'(O) i5 big enough8 to guarantee that it is never optimal to set investment to zero. The 
necessary condition fur the investment problem is: 
1!'(a"")[fI(PlJiCIl4l1(Pll» -fI(Pu,;ck,¡Mplh))] + m,.(a*,y) [ll(P2I;c¡,$¡(P2JitMpu») -ll(P2k;ch,IMp2tV4It(Plh»)] -1 = O (12) 
3.4 Equilibrium of Ihe Whole Game: Exislence and Stability 
In tms sub-section 1 show that equilibrium exists and discuss stability. 
Given Lemmas 1-3 there can be four types of price equilibria depending on whether high cost firms 
choose to be active or inactive in each of the of the two periods. The characterization of the investrnent and 
search best response functions is a straightforward application of the implicit function theorem (see appendix). 
Using Lemmas 1~3, equation (12) defines the firms' investment best response function: 
(13) 
which is of the fonn: A(.): [pi ,+""') x [pi ,+00)x [0,+""') x (0,+"",) -----) [!{,ii], where !!:= A(pr ,P;;' ,0,+""'), 
7i := A(r2 - e,c" - e,+_,_oo), e> o, and ls differentiable, except at PI = rl' 1'2 and P2 = C", where it has upward 
discontinuities: A(a¡cl,r,t5) < lim A(a¡c¡,r,o). When both reservation prices are higher than the high 
.~. 
cost firms' rnonopoly price, PI > Pi:', both t, investment does not depend on the reservation prices. When within a 
type of equilibrium at least one of the reservation prlces is lower than the high cost firms' monopoly price, A 
< pr, sorne t, investment falls with that reservation price. When due to a rise in a reservation price causes high 
cost firms to become active for a period, inveshnent falls discontinuously. Investrnent falls with idiosyncratic 
cost volatility. 
Asswne that the period 1 reaUzed rneasure of low cost firrns equals the expected measure of low cost 
firms: p.= J jl(a(i» di.9 Given synunetry it follows that: 
, 
, 
p.= J jl(a(i» di = jl(a) 
, 
, Le., ji= ji(a), with {t" < ° < (t'; m '" mea, r), Le., m = m(a, r), with m/llJ < ° < m", and mal < O. 
8 TItat Is, ll'(O):> l/(A( p~ ,'1; p;", p: c,.,vl) - A( p: ,<1.; p;", p: ,cvvJI. 
9 TItis assumptlon is justlfiable because theinvestment trials are made independently. 
(14) 
Using (5) and (14), equation (4) defines the period 2 search best response function: 
Pl = R2(a;c" y,o-) (15) 
which is of the forro R2(.): [0,+00) X [0,+<><» X (-"",+00) X (0,+<><» ~ [pj,+oo), is continuously differentiable, 
falls with investment, rises with the search cost, the low cost level, and with idiosyncratic cost volatility if 
the period 2 proportion of low cost firms falls with idiosyncratic cost volatility, sgn {aR2¡dy} = -sgn{mJ. 
Using (10), (11), (14), and (15), equation (7) defines the perlod 1 search best response function: 
(16) 
which is of the fonn Rl(.): [0,+<><»X [0,+00) X (-00,+00) x (0,+",,) ~ [pi,+o<», is continuously differentiable, 
falls with investment, rises with the search cost, the low cost level, and idiosyncratic cost volatility. 
Equilibrium is given by equations (13), (15) and (16). 
To discuss stability consider the follmving adjustment process, consisting of a succession of rounds, each 
composed of two stages. In the first stage of each round, finns choose an investment leve} which is a best 
response to the perlod 1 and perlod 2 reservation prices chosen by the consumers in the previous round. In the 
second stage, ronsumers choose perlad 1 and perlod 2 reservation prices which are best responses to the 
invesbnent level chosen by firms in the first stage of that mundo A steady state {n° ,pt, p;} of the adjustment 
process is an equilibrium: {u*,pt ,p;} = {A(¡:)¡' ,P; ;cj,r),R1(u";cj,r,a),R1(u· ;c¡,r,a)}. An equilibrium{u",q" ,p;} 
is locally asymptotically stable for the adjustment process, if there exists a neighborhood of fa",q·, p;} such 
that for any initial point on the neighborhood, the adjustment process converges to fa·,,q", p;}; otherwise an 
equilibrium is unsfable. Let dy,x) denote the elasticity oí y with respect to x. 
Proposition 1: (i) Equilibrium exists. (ii) Equilibrlum is unique if globally: 
E(A,Pl)E(R1,a) + E(A,pz)E(Rz,a) <1 (17) 
(iií) Equilibria for wbich (22) holds locally, are locally asymptotically stable, otherwise they are unsfable. 
Proof: (i) 
(14) on (11) one gets the mapping. a A.(a;c/,8,a) 
.4.(.): [,!!,a] x [0,+<><» X (--<><>,+00) X (O,U) ~ [,!!,a], which is continuous with respect to a, except at al, a2, and a3, 
where it has upward discontinuities (A,.. < 0, and R
'
• < O). Thus, by Tarski's fixed point theorem A.(.), has a 
fixed point for every (cl,8,a) on [0,+00) x (--<><>,+00) x (O,a). 
12 
(ü) 
13 
Let g(a;c,,'y,a) := A(a;c¡, y,a) - a, g: ..4(.): [!!,a] x (0,1) x(O, VII) x (O,a) ~ 9t andg(.)is continuous with 
respect to a, except at al' a2; and «3.' Since g( ª;cl,'y,a) > 0, g(a;c,,'y,a) < O, a sufficient condition for uniqueness is 
iJgjtJa < O, i.e., iJg¡iJa = (iJA¡iJpl) (iJRJ liJa) + (iJA¡iJp2) <iJR2jiJa) -1 < 0, 
(m) See Pe'e'ca (9S) 
4 Comparative Statics 
'JI 
In tbis section 1 do the local comparative statics. 1 show that rise in either idiosyncratic or industry 
wide cost volatility or the search cost can reduce investment, and rise the reservation prices. 
Proposition 2: At localIy stable equilíbrla: (i) If the period 2 reservation price is not between the high 
cost level and the high cost firms' monopoly price, P2~[c¡"pr), or, if the perlod 2 proportion of low rost firms is 
non-increasing in idiosyncratic cost volatility, 
(1S) 
then a rise in idiosyncratic cosf volatility reduces investment and increases both reservation prices; otherwise a 
change in idiosyncratic cost volatility can have a potentially ambiguous impad on inveslment and the 
reservation prices. (ti) A rise in industry wide cosfvolatility reduces investment and increases both reservation 
prices. (iii) A rise in the search cost reduces investment and increases both reservation prices. 
gives 
aa aa 
dy ac¡ 
ap! ap! 
ir( Oc, 
apz aP2 
dy ac¡ 
O. 
ila [ A., + ApIR~ + AplR~ 
a:; = M-1 R~[1 - Ap~R;J+ ApIR~R! + A.,R! 
ap2 R~[1 - Ap,R~l+ Ap,R~R; + ArR~ 
ila 
Ac¡ + ApIR~J + AplR~J 
R~,[1 - AplR~]+ ApIR~JR! + Ac¡R! 
R~¡{1 - Ap,R!J+ Ap,R~¡Ri + Ac,R~ 
Apt R~ + Ap,R~ j 
AP2 R!R~ + R~(1 - Ap. R;l 
AP1R~R~ + R~[1 - A p,R!l 
with M = 1 - APlR: - Ap¡R~ > O given (17). Thus: aafac¡ <O, apt/ac¡ >0, aP2!ac¡ >0; aa/ars<O, 
apt/acr > 0, apzJikI > Oi and if R~ > ° or Ap, = O: aa/ay> 0, apl/ay > 0, ap2/ay > o. 'II 
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Appendix 
Using Lenunas 1-3 (12) can be written as: 
¡.t'(a)[1t(pl';c¡) -1t(Pl;Ch}] + mata, y)[1t(pj;c¡) -1t(PZ;Ch)] - 1 = O rt.$ p¡ .$ Ph ,eh::;; P2 ::;; Ph 
J.l'(a)[X<pr';c¡)-mpl;ch)] + m a(a,Y)[1t(Pl';C¡)-1t(Pg';Ch)] - 1 "" O Tt::;;Pt::;;Ph,Ph<PZ 
J.1'(a)[1t(pr';c¡)-mp:h;ch)] + m a(a,"O[1t(pj;e¡)-1t(P2;Ch)] - 1 "" O Ph'<Pt,ch.$P2::;;Pg' 
¡.t'(a)[1t(pj;c¡) - 1t(Ph' ;Ch)] + ma(a,y)[mpr' ;c¡) -1t(Ph ;Ch)] - 1 = O Ph < Pt,P2 
iJ.'(a)[mpi;c¡)-1t(p¡;c¡)] + (":a(a,Y)}(pj;C¡) -1 "" O T2.$P¡<Ph',P2<Ch 
m(a,Y) 
(M'(a») (m ) [(M'(a)}1 ) (m,(a,y)\.] (m ) 1 O ¡l(a) 1t PI ;e¡ + ¡lea) -vn + m(a,y) FU 1t p¡ ;c¡ - = Pt <T2,P2 <Ch 
which defines implicitly a "" A(Pl,P2fC/,rJ and shows that when due to a faU in a reservation price the model 
switches between types of equilibria, the marginal benefit of investment rises discontinuously. 
Using (5) and (14), (4) can be wriHen as 
{ 
m(a,y)[S(pr)-S(p,)] - a = <= p,~ p~ 
m(a,y)[S(pi)-S(ph')] + [S(Pi:')-S(P2)] - cr = ° {:::: P2> Ph 
which defines implicitIy p~ = R2 (a;c"r,cr). Straightforward differentiation shows that R 2 is strictly decreasing 
in a, and strictly increasing i,n e¡, crand sgn{iJR2J ifr} = -sgn{m). 
Using (10), (11), (14), and (15), (7) can be written as 
14 jí(a){[S(pr)-S(pt)] + (Vn -Vh1)[S(pi')-S(Pz)]} -cr = o {:::: Pt,PZ <Ph 
¡1(a){[S(pj)-S(Pt)] + (vn-Vh.\)[S(pi)-S(Pb>]) -cr';" o {:::: p¡ <Ph <Pz 
¡1(a)[S(pi)-S(Pb)]+ IS(Ph)-S(PI~+ ¡1(aXVn -Vh1)[S(pj)-S(pz)]-cr '" o {:::: pz <Pi:' <Pt 
¡1(a){[S(pj)-S(pi:')] + (Vll-Vh1)[S(pi)-S(ph'>]) + IS(ph'>-S(p¡~-cr "" o {:::: Ph <p¡,PZ 
or using R2(.) and defining ro(a,r,cr) := {1 - ji(a)(Vu(r) - V/d(r»/[V/d(r)+ ji(a)(VI/(r)- Vk/(r»J}cr > o 
f!.(a)[S(pj)-S{PI)] - m(a,y,n) = o {:::: P¡,P2 <Pi:' 
¡1(a){[S(pj)-S(Pt)] + (Vn-Vh1)[S(Pf')-S(Pb)]} -o = o {:::: PI <Pb<P2 
¡1(a)[S(pi)-S<Pb)]+ IS(Ph')-S(pl~-m(a,y,n) = O {:::: P2 <Ph <PI 
¡:i.(a){[S(pf')-S<Ph)] + (Vn -Vh1)[S(pj)-S(ph')]} + lS<ph')-S<Pt~-n = ° {:::: Ph <Pt,P2 
which defines implidtly p¡ = R1(a;c¡,y,cr). Differentiating liJ: liJr = cr[ií(V//-V/d)vh/]/ñí 2 > O, liJ. = 
- a[ií'(VII-Vhl)Vhl]/ñí2 < 0, liJ" = {1 - ji(vu -V/d)J[Vhl + ji(VI/-V/d>J} > O. Consider p¡, P2 < pr (the others cases 
are similar). Then: iJpdiJa = - {ií'[S(pj)-S(p¡)] - GIa}/iix(p¡) < 0, iJpd(}y = GIr/jlx(A) > O, iJA/iJq = 
liJ,,/jJx(A) > O, iJp¡/iJc¡ = j¡x(pj)(iJpj /ikl)jjjx(A) > O, and therefore R1 is strictly decreasing in a and strictly 
increasing in c" 1, and o: 
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